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Trial Practice and Procedure
by T. Bart Gary*

This survey represents only some of the several hundred cases decided
by the appellate courts in the area of trial practice and procedure. Those
selected for comment were deemed significant because they either resolve
new questions or illustrate the application of important principles of procedure. This follows the format established in the past for this survey.
Personal jurisdiction, venue, and attachment and garnishment are discussed first, followed by cases arranged in numerical order under each section of the Civil Practice Act.
I.

PERSONAL JURISDICTION

The trend of decisions from the United States Supreme Court in recent
years has been to limit the states' exercise of personal jurisdiction over
nonresidents.1 The trend continues this year in World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson.2 The case began as a products liability case in an
Oklahoma state court. The plaintiffs had purchased an Audi automobile
in New York and while driving through Oklahoma on their way to Arizona, their car was struck in the rear by another automobile. The plaintiffs' automobile caught fire and severely burned the plaintiffs. The defendants were the car's manufacturer, importer, regional distributor, and
retail dealer; however, only the regional distributor, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. (World-Wide), and retail dealer, Seaway Volkswagen, Inc.
(Seaway), challenged the state court's jurisdiction. World-Wide was a
New York corporation which distributed automobiles, parts, and accesso* Law Clerk to Judge R. Lanier Anderson, III, United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit. Furman University (B.A., 1975); University of Georgia (J.D., 1978). The opinions expressed herein are entirely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those
of the court.
1. See Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186
(1977); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958). See also Gary, Annual Survey of Georgia
Law: Trial Practice and Procedure, 31 MERCER L. REv. 249 (1979).
2. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
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ries in New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut. Seaway was a dealer located in New York. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that the state
court had personal jurisdiction over the defendants essentially on the
ground that it was foreseeable that the vehicle, being mobile by nature,
would be used in Oklahoma.3 The Supreme Court reversed. The majority
examined the nature of the defendants' contracts with Oklahoma and
found them insufficient under the standards of InternationalShoe Co. v.
Washington.4 The defendants carried on no business in Oklahoma, they
had no sales or services there, they did not solicit business in Oklahoma,
nor did they regularly sell cars to Oklahoma residents or seek to service
directly, or indirectly, Oklahoma customers. The majority viewed it as a
wholly fortuitous event that an automobile purchased in New York by
New York residents would have an accident while passing through
Oklahoma. The Court conceded that it is foreseeable that an automobile,
being mobile by design and purpose, would cause injury in Oklahoma;
however, it cautioned that "'foreseeability' alone has never been a sufficient benchmark for personal jurisdiction under the Due Process
Clause." 5 The Court continued,
...the foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is not the
mere likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum State.

Rather, it is that the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum
State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into
court there.
The majority did not, however, reject the stream of commerce theory that
if a defendant places a product in the stream of interstate commerce destined for use in another state, it is not unreasonable to hold him answerable in that state for injuries resulting from the product. 7 "The forum

State does not exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products
into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum State."8 Therefore, it is not sufficient
for jurisdictional purposes that a product might foreseeably or possibly
come to rest and cause injury in a particular state. Indeed, in this day of
mobility, a product might ultimately come to rest in any state. Rather,
the defendant must expect that the product will be purchased in a partic3. 585 P.2d 351 (Okla. 1978).
4. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
5. 444 U.S. at 295.
6. Id. at 297.
7. See Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d
761 (1961).
8. 444 U.S. at 297-98 (emphasis added).
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ular jurisdiction when he places it in commerce. The majority would distinguish mere foreseeability from expectation or anticipation. Although
there is no difference in the definition of the terms, the majority apparently attributes a greater degree of awareness to its meaning of expectation than to forseeability. The focus would appear to be on the defendant's awareness or knowledge at the time he places a product in the
stream of commerce as to where the product will be purchased.
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun dissented, all three emphasizing the mobile nature of the automobile and the foreseeability that it
would come to rest in Oklahoma.
Justice Brennan, however, offered a more expansive theory of personal
jurisdiction over nonresidents which weighs the forum's interest in the
subject matter of the litigation against the burden to the defendant in
defending in the forum. According to Justice Brennan, once the plaintiff
shows that the forum state has a sufficient interest in the litigation or
contacts with the defendant, the burden shifts to the defendant to show
some real injury or hardship in being required to appear in the forum.
Distance alone, in this day of rapid long-distance transportation, is not a
sufficient excuse. Justice Brennan found that the forum did have a strong
interest in the litigation which outweighed any hardship to the defendant.
The accident occurred in Oklahoma, the plaintiffs were hospitalized
there, and the witnesses and evidence were in Oklahoma.'
Under Georgia's Long Arm Statute, 0 a nonresident tortfeasor may be
subject to the jurisdiction of Georgia courts if he
(b) Commits a tortious act or omission within this State... ; or (c) Commits a tortious injury in this State caused by an act or omission outside
this State, if the tortfeasor regularly does or solicits business, or engages
in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue
from goods used or consumed or services rendered in this State."

9. In another case, Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980), the Court disapproved Seider
v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99, 216 N.E.2d 312 (1966), which held that the contractual obligation of an insurance company to its insured under a liability insurance policy
is a debt subject to attachment in order to obtain personal jurisdiction over the insured if
the insurance company does business in the forum state. The automobile accident which
formed the predicate of the lawsuit occurred in Indiana between two Indiana residents, but
the plaintiff thereafter moved to Minnesota and filed suit there. The defendant's insurer did
business in Minnesota and the plaintiff attached the insurance company's obligation to defend and pay any judgment against the defendant in order to obtain personal jurisdiction
over the defendant. The Court held that the insurer's decision to do business in Minnesota
was a fortuitous event over which the defendant had no control. It could not be said that
the defendant had engaged in any purposeful activity related to the forum which would
make the exercise of jurisdiction fair, just, or reasonable.
10. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-113.1 (1971).
11.

Id.
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As originally written the Long Arm Statute contained only subsection (b)
respecting tortious conduct."2 In 1969 the Georgia Court of Appeals decided that subsection (b) applied only to tortious conduct within the
state." Before the supreme court could address the question, the general
assembly amended the statute by adding subsection (c) in order to ex-

pand the statute to include tortious conduct outside the state as well as
within the state;' 4 however, in Coe & Payne Co. v. Wood-Mosaic Corp., 5
the supreme court held that the court of appeals was wrong in its narrow
interpretation of subsection (b). The court gave it an expansive reading to
comprehend tortious conduct outside Georgia which causes injury within
the state, as well as tortious conduct within the state. Since the expansive
reading of subsection (b) in Coe & Payne, there has been much debate
over the efficacy of subsection (c). Some commentators believed that Coe
& Payne rendered subsection (c) nugatory.16 On the other hand, one commentator argued that the general assembly intended subsection (b) and
(c) to cover two entirely different situations-one where the tortious con-

duct occurs within the state and the other where it occurs outside the
state-and that Coe & Payne should be limited to its facts as an interim
stopgap measure.' 7 During this survey period the supreme court resolved
the dispute. In Clarkson Power Flow, Inc. v. Thompson," the court held
"that there is no essential difference between subsections (b) and (c)."'
The court explained that subsection (c) was enacted simply to get around
the court of appeals' restrictive interpretation of subsection (b) and that
the limitations articulated in subsection (c) are constitutionally mandated

under subsection (b) as well.20
12. 1966 Ga. Laws 343.
13. O'Neal Steel, Inc. v. Smith, 120 Ga. App. 106, 169 S.E.2d 827, vacated, 225 Ga. 778,
171 S.E.2d 519 (1969), rev'd on other grounds, 121 Ga. App. 8, 172 S.E.2d 479 (1970).
14. 1970 Ga. Laws 443, 444-45.
15. 230 Ga. 58, 195 S.E.2d 399 (1973).
16. Ellington, Annual Survey of Georgia Law: Trial Practice and Procedure, 29 MERCER
L. REv. 265, 266 (1977); Beaird and Ellington, Annual Survey of Georgia Law: Trial Practice and Procedure, 25 MERcER L. Rav. 265, 269 (1974); Impact of the Coe & Payne Decision on Georgia's Long-Arm Statute, 10 GA. S.B.J. 164, 174 (1973).
17. Note, The Georgia Long-Arm Statute, 11 GA. L. REv. 149, 178-81 (1976).
18. 244 Ga. 300, 260 S.E.2d.9 (1979).
19. Id. at 302, 260 S.E.2d at 11.
20. In 1977 the general assembly amended the definition of "nonresident" in the Long
Arm Statute to include persons who were residents of Georgia at the time the claim arose
but who were nonresidents at the time the suit was filed. 1977 Ga. Laws 587. The amendment provided that it would apply to all pending actions as of its effective date and to all
actions subsequently filed. In Ballew v. Riggs, 244 Ga. 232, 259 S.E.2d 482 (1979), the court
held that retroactive application of the amendment was constitutional. In Ballew the claim
arose prior to the 1977 amendment but was filed after its effective date. The court distinguished Bauer International Corp. v. Cagles, Inc., 225 Ga. 684, 171 S.E.2d 314 (1969), which
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Finally, a case decided by the court of appeals provides a new context
and interpretation of the Long Arm Statute. In Hollingsworth v. Cunard
Lines Ltd.,' 1 two disgruntled passengers were suing a nonresident cruise
ship line for breach of contract and fraud based upon certain misrepresentations that, among other things, organized poker games were available on the cruise ship. Cunard Lines, a foreign corporation not registered
to do business in Georgia, hired the Thomas Cook Travel Agency to handle a nationwide promotion of the round-the-world cruise and had given
Cook blank passenger ticket stock which Cook in turn distributed to local
travel agencies. The cruise was advertised in the Atlanta Journal-Constitution which excited the Hollingworths' interest in the cruise. They applied for passage through the Osborne Travel Agency of Atlanta. Osborne
promised that poker games and other activities were available on thd
cruise and completed the Hollingsworths' application. Cunard Lines confirmed the reservation in New York and forwarded the tickets to Georgia.
Cunard Lines denied any principal-agent agreement between itself and
any local travel agencies including Osborne and maintained that only it
could book and confirm accommodations on its vessels.
The court of appeals addressed only the question of whether Cunard
Lines had transacted any business in Georgia within the meaning of subsection (a) of the Long Arm Statute."2 The court pointed to the aggregate
of circumstances-the nationwide advertisement campaign, the distribution of blank ticket stock to local travel agents, the frequent telephone
calls to Georgia, and the mailing of tickets to Georgia-to find the necessary minimum contacts with Georgia. The court rejected Cunard Lines'
argument that the travel agent was not its agent in terms of traditional
notions of principal-agency. The court stated that with modern theories
of personal jurisdiction " . . . the jurisdictional distinction between
agents and independent contractors has begun to fade. Courts treat persons who derive commission revenue [travel agencies], not in terms of
agents or independent contractors, but they view their activities and status, in a realistic commercial light."' 2 The court perceived that Cunard
Lines, by use of operatives termed independent contractors rather than
agents or employees, was attempting to insulate itself from local jurisdichad held that an amendment to the Long Arm Statute amending the definition of "nonresident" to include corporations could not be constitutionally applied retrospectively. In Bauer
the court concluded that the amendment affected substantive rights of the parties and could
not have retrospective application. In Ballew, however, the court held that the 1977
"amendment [was] remedial in nature and [did] not affect the substantive rights of the
defendant." 244 Ga. at 233-34, 259 S.E.2d at 483.
21. 152 Ga. App. 509, 263 S.E.2d 190 (1979).
22. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-113.1(a) (1971).
23. 152 Ga. App. at 513, 263 S.E.2d at 193, quoting Mulhern v. Holland American
Cruises, 393 F. Supp. 1298, 1302 (D.N.H. 1975).
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tion. Viewed realistically, Cunard Lines was creating consumer demand
by national advertising and was supplying local travel agencies with blank
ticket stock to fill that demand. Regardless of whether the travel agencies
were termed agents or independent contractors, Cunard Lines was systematically and purposefully deriving economic benefit from the state
through its own efforts.
The decision appears to be at odds with the general rule that "if the
corporation's business in the state is conducted by independent contractors with only limited power to act on behalf of the corporation as
Cunard Lines urged that local travel agents were then the corporation
'
probably will not be held to be doing business in the state."24
"Probably",
however, is the key word, and at least one other court rejected the independent contractor argument where it was "clearly defendant's business
objective to sell its products on a regular and continuing basis" in the
forum state."5 CunardLines is another case where general rules give way
to practical considerations in the area of personal jurisdiction over
nonresidents.

II. VENUE
The Constitution of Georgia provides that "[sluits against joint obligors, joint promissors, co-partners, or joint trespassers, residing in different counties, may be tried in either county."2 " The provision applies only
where all the defendants are residents of Georgia 2 7 In Bergen v. Martindale-Hubbell, Inc.,1s the plaintiff filed suit in Chatham County Superior
Court against Martindale-Hubbell, a foreign corporation not authorized
to transact business in Georgia, and its field representative Forbes, a resident of DeKalb County, Georgia. Venue was proper as to MartindaleHubbell in Chatham County and the plaintiff sought to establish venue
against Forbes through the special venue provision for joint tortfeasors.
The supreme court held that venue was improper as to Forbes in Chatham County. It reasoned that although the Long Arm Statute made Martindale-Hubbell amenable to suit in Georgia and particularly in Chatham
County, it specifically did not make it a resident of Georgia or of any
county for purposes of venue." The court distinguished three cases"
24.

4 C.

WRIGHT

& A.

MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §

1069 (1969).

25. Scott Paper Co. v. Scotts Liquid Gold, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 184, 188 (D. Del. 1974).
26. GA. CONST. art. VI, § 14, 4, GA. CODE ANN. § 2-4304 (1977).
27. See e.g. Benton Rapid Express, Inc. v. Johnson, 202 Ga. 597, 43 S.E.2d 667 (1947).
28. 245 Ga. 742, 267 S.E.2d 10 (1980).
29. The Long Arm Statute defines a nonresident as "a corporation which is not organized or existing under the laws of this State and is not authorized to do or transact business
in this State." GA. CODE ANN. § 24-117 (Supp. 1979). Under this definition the court concluded that Martindale-Hubbel could not be considered a resident of Georgia. But cf. GA.
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wherein a resident defendant and a foreign corporation were sued jointly
on the ground that "the suits were brought in counties where the foreign
corporations had agents, if not also offices, and the court found them to
be 'residents' of those counties.131
In Nelson Associates v. Grubbs,'1 a limited partnership with its principal place of business in Pennsylvania was sued for breach of contract in
Sumter County where it owned real property. Three of the partners were
residents of Pennsylvania and New Jersey, but the general partner was a
resident of Dade County, Georgia. Venue was proper as to the nonresident partners in Sumter County;88 however, the defendant alleged that
since one of the partners was a resident of Georgia, the partnership could
only be sued in his county of residence-Dade County. The court of appeals held that a partnership may be sued in any county where jurisdiction and venue are proper as to any one of its partners. Since venue was
proper as. to the nonresident partners in Sumter County, the partnership
could be sued there.
Although the two decisions appear to be in conflict," the supreme court
in Martindale-Hubbell did not overrule Nelson but stated only that "if
the resident partner had been sued in Nelson . . ., a different result
would have obtained. 8' 3 The court's meaning is not clear; however, the
reported decision in Nelson shows that the partnership was sued in its
firm name alone; none of the partners were sued individually. Perhaps
the court was saying that where Georgia residents are not directly sued,
CODE ANN. § 24-113.1 (1971) (a court of this state may exercise jurisdiction over a nonresi-

dent "in the same manner as if he were a resident of the State.").
30. Southern Ry. v. Grizzle, 124 Ga. 735, 53 S.E. 244 (1906); Jones v. Chandler, 88 Ga.
App. 103, 76 S.E.2d 237 (1953); and Morris v. George, 3 Ga. App. 413, 59 S.E. 1116 (1908).
31. 245 Ga. at 744 n.2, 267 S.E.2d at 11-12 n.2. See also GA. CODE ANN. § 22-404(b)
(1977) which, for purposes of determining venue, provides that a "foreign corporation authorized to transact business in this State shall be deemed to reside in the county where its
registered office is maintained."
32. 135 Ga. App. 947, 219 S.E.2d 607 (1975).
33. The partnership owned real estate in Sumter County and the contract sued upon
was to be performed in Sumter County. The Long Arm Statute fixes venue in "any county
wherein the business was transacted, the act or omission occurred, or the real property is
located." GA. CODE ANN. § 24-116 (1971).
34. The holding in Martindale-Hubbell is on all fours with the earlier court of appeals
decision of Hays v. Jones, 81 Ga. App. 597, 59 S.E.2d 404 (1950), which is in direct conflict
with the reasoning in Nelson. See Beaird and Ellington, Annual Survey of Georgia Law:
Trial Practice and Procedure, 28 MERcER L. REv. 257, 265 (1976). In Hays v. Jones, the
plaintiff attempted to use the joint tortfeasor venue rule to obtain venue over a resident
defendant in a county where venue was proper over the nonresident defendant under the
Non-Resident Motorists Act, 1947 Ga. Laws, 305, 306, either in the county where the claim
arose or where the plaintiff resided. The court of appeals held that the Act did not allow a
resident defendant to be sued outside the county of his residence.
35. 245 Ga. at 744 n.2, 267 S.E.2d at 11-12 n.2.
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their right to be sued in the county of their residence is not implicated
and venue may be fixed where it is proper for the nonresidents."
III.

ATTACHMENT AND GARNISHMENT

In 1978 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals declared Georgia's prejudgment attachment law8 7 unconstitutional as violative of the due process
clause."8 Although the court held the scheme unconstitutional on the sole
ground that it did not permit the officer to whom the application was
made any discretion to deny the writ, other constitutional deficiencies
were apparent. Among the most notable defects were that the scheme
permitted the clerk of the court, as well as the judge, to issue the writ of
attachment, the statute did not require affidavits of fact as opposed to
conclusions in support of the application for attachment, and there was
no procedure for a prompt post-seizure hearing."' During the 1980 legislative session, the general assembly amended the statutory scheme for attachment in an effort to remedy its constitutional shortcomings. 40 The
amendment provides that only "a judge of any court of record, other than
the probate court" may hear and rule upon an application for attachment.' The application must "be made in writing, under oath, and shall
set forth specific facts that show the existence of one or more of [the six
statutory grounds for issuance of a writ of attachment], the basis and na36. This explanation is not entirely satisfactory for, in order to decide that venue was
proper in Nelson, the court of appeals apparently considered the nonresident partners to be
residents of Sumter County for purposes of venue.
Such an interpretation of Nelson is contrary to the supreme court's interpretation of the
Long Arm Statute (GA. CODE ANN. § 24-177 (Supp. 1980)) that a nonresident is not declared
to be a resident of the county where venue is fixed by the long arm statute. But see Reading
Assoc. v. Reading Assoc. of Georgia, 236 Ga. 906, 225 S.E.2d 899 (1976), where the supreme
court held that jurisdiction over the nonresident general partner of a limited partnership

may be exercised under the long arm statute "as if he were resident." Perhaps only a superficial reconciliation of Martindale-Hubbell and Nelson will suffice: one involved a suit
against a partnership where the resident partner was not sued, the other a suit against joint
tortfeasors where a resident tortfeasor was sued.
The court of appeals held in Parker v. Ryder Truck Lines, Inc., 150 Ga. App. 163, 257
S.E.2d 18 (1979), that venue against a nonresident motor carrier in a claim arising from a
vehicular accident could be established either under the Non-Resident Motorist Act, GA.
CODE ANN. § 68-803 (1980), in the county where the accident occurred or the plaintiff resided, or under the Motor Common Carrier Act, GA. CODE ANN. § 68-618(b) (1980), in the
county where the cause of action arose.
37.

GA. CODE ANN. §§ 8-101-119 (1973).

38. Johnson v. American Credit Co., 581 F.2d 526 (5th Cir. 1978).
39. See Gary, Annual Survey of Georgia Law: Trial Practiceand Procedure,31 MERcER
L. REV. 253, 256-57 n.41 (1979).
40. See 1980 Ga. Laws, 1065.
41.

GA. CODE ANN. § 8-109(b) (Supp. 1980).
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ture of the claim and the amount of indebtedness claimed therein by the
plaintiff.""' The judge must then "inquire into the facts alleged, going
beyond mere conclusory allegations"' s to determine whether attachment
is warranted. The amendments make it clear that the judge has discretion
to deny the writ. The amendments also set forth several methods of giving written notice of the application for attachment and of the writ of
attachment to the defendant." Most importantly, the amendments add a
new section providing the defendant an opportunity to traverse the allegations of the affidavit and requiring a hearing on 5the traverse not more
than ten (10) days from the filing of the traverse.'
The general assembly also made several amendments to the garnishment law. 4" Most notably, the legislature enacted a procedure for continuing garnishment against the employer of a judgment debtor. 7 Until this
enactment, each garnishment reached only debts accruing or property
coming into the hands of the garnishee on or before the time for filing the
answer-not later than forty-five days after service of summons upon the
garnishee. 4 Under the continuing garnishment provision, however, all
debts accruing or money and property coming into the garnishee's possession from the date of service of the garnishment "to and including the
one hundred seventy-ninth day thereafter shall be subject to process of
42.

Id. The six statutory grounds are:
1. When the debtor resides out of the state.
2. When the debtor is actually removing, or about to remove, without the limits
of the county.
3. When the debtor absconds.
4. When the debtor conceals himself.
5. When the debtor resists legal arrest.
6. When the debtor is causing his property to be removed beyond the limits of
the state. GA. CODE ANN. § 8-101 (1973).
43. GA. CODE ANN. § 8-109(b) (Supp. 1980).
44.

1980 Ga. Laws, 1065, 1068-67. The provision for written notice to the defendant is

virtually identical to the provision for notice to the debtor of a post-judgment garnishment
proceeding. See GA. CODE ANN. § 46-105 (1979). In Easterwood v. LeBlanc, 240 Ga. 61, 62,
239 S.E.2d 383, 384 (1977), the court stated that the notice of garnishment provision "is
extensive, and provides adequate notice to the judgment defendant that a garnishment proceeding has been filed."
45. GA. CODE ANN. § 8-114.1 (Supp. 1980). The general assembly also repealed several
chapters of the Attachment Title of the Georgia Code including: Chapter 3, Attachments for
purchase money; Chapter 4, Attachments against fraudulent debtors; Chapter 5, Proceedings on garnishment in attachment; Chapter 6, Pleadings and defenses in attachment; and
Chapter 9, Lien of attachments; judgment and execution. 1980 Ga. laws 1065, 1074-75.
46. 1980 Ga. Laws 1769.
47. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 46-701 to 709 (Supp. 1980). The continuing garnishment provisions will become effective on January 1, 1981; however, all other amendments became effective on April 9, 1980.
48. Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 46-301(a), (b) (1979) with GA. CODE ANN. § 46-103 (1979).
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continuing garnishment.'"4 The procedures for continuing garnishment
are much the same as for any other garnishment except that the garnishee must be an employer of the defendant and the affidavit must state
that fact."
The garnishment law was also amended to specify that the process of
garnishment was available to satisfy a judgment obtained in a federal
court sitting in Georgia, as well as for one obtained in a state court."1
Furthermore, Georgia Code Ann. section 46-509, which allows the garnishee to move for relief from a default judgment by motion filed not
later than sixty days after he receives notice of the entry of default judgment was amended.51 The amendment changes the way in which the 5re53
duction of judgment is calculated and changes the burden of proof. '

IV.
A.

SERVICE OF PROCESS AND FILING

Service

In Benton v. Modern Finance & Investment Co.,55 the supreme court
declared the method of service by tacking as provided in the Civil Practice Act, section 4(d)(6), unconstitutional. Section 4(d)(6) provided for
service of process "[i]f the principal sum involved is less than $200, by
leaving a copy [of the summons and complaint] at the [defendant's] most
notorious place of abode."5 Due process requires that the method of service be "reasonably calculated to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and to afford them an opportunity to present their
49. GA. CODE ANN. § 46-702(a) (Supp. 1980).
50. GA. CODE ANN. § 46-703(a) (Supp. 1980).
51. GA. CODE ANN. § 46-101 (Supp. 1980). The United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia held that the process of garnishment was unavailable to satisfy
a judgment obtained in the federal district courts because the statute (GA. CODE ANN. § 46101 (1979)) provided for garnishment for judgments "obtained in a court of this State." The
court interpreted this phrase to exclude judgments of federal courts. Diversified Mortgage
Investors v. Georgia-Carolina Indus. Park Venture, 463 F. Supp. 538 (N.D. Ga. 1978).
52. GA. CODE ANN. § 46-509 (Supp. 1980).
53. Under the law as formerly written (1977 Ga. Laws 783, 784) the default judgment
could be reduced to 125 percent of the total amount which was subject to garnishment on or
before the last day on which the answer could have been filed. The amendment provides
that the judgment will be reduced to the greater of $50 or $50 plus 100 percent of the
amount subject to garnishment. 1980 Ga. Laws 1769, 1774.
54. Before the amendment the burden of proving the timeliness of a motion for relief
from a default judgment was on the garnishee. See Sambo's, Inc. v. First Am. Nat'l Bank,
152 Ga. App. 899, 264 S.E.2d 330 (1980); 1977 Ga. Laws 783, 784. The amendment places
the burden upon the plaintiff to prove that the motion was not filed within the time provided by law. 1980 Ga. Laws 1769, 1774.
55. 244 Ga. 533, 261 S.E.2d 359 (1979).
56. GA. CODE ANN. § 81A-104(d)(6) (1977).

1980]
objections.

TRIAL PRACTICE
' 57

235

The court explained:

The mere leaving of copy of suit at the residence of the defendant is not
reasonably calculated to apprise him of the pendency of an action against
him. He may be absent from such abode for an extended length of time.
He may be in the process of moving from one residence to another. The
copy may be destroyed by inclement weather, or be removed by other
persons."
Justice Hill concurred in the judgment but suggested that section 4(d)(6)
might be more tightly drawn to make it more certain that it would inform
a defendant of the lawsuit. The complaint might be placed in a marked,
waterproof packet high on the door of the defendant's residence followed
by duplicate service by mail. The general assembly quickly heeded Justice Hill's advice and amended section 4(d)(6). Service may be made
(6) If the principal sum involved is less than $200.00, and if reasonable
efforts have been made to obtain personal service by attempting to find
some person residing at the most notorious place of abode of the defendant, then by securely attaching the service copy of the complaint in a
conspicuously marked and waterproof packet to the upper part of the
door of said abode and on the same day mailing by certified or registered
mail an additional copy to the defendant at his last known address, if
any, and making an entry of this action on the return of service."
Though the amendment purports to be a method of personal service, it
might also be considered a substitute method of service where personal
service is difficult or impossible. Before the plaintiff may avail himself of
the tacking method of service, he must first make "reasonable efforts" to
obtain personal service on someone residing at defendant's most notorious place of abode.60 By phrasing "reasonable efforts" in the plural, the
legislature implies that more than one unsuccessful visit to the defen57. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
58. 244 Ga. at 535, 261 S.E.2d at 360, quoting Womble v. Commercial Credit Corp., 231
Ga. 569, 571, 203 S.E.2d 204, 206 (1974). Womble held a similar service by tacking provision
unconstitutional on grounds that the method of service was not reasonably calculated to
inform the defendant of the pendency of the action.
59. 1980 Ga. Laws 1124, 1125.
60. The amended section 4(d)(6) appears to refer to the method of service provided in
section 4(d)(7) (GA. CODE ANN. § 81A-104(d)(7) (Supp. 1980)) by leaving process at the
defendant's "usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion then
residing therein." Although the amendment fails to include the requirement that the person
be of "suitable age and discretion," it is unlikely that the legislature intended service upon a
very young child or an imcompetent to suffice.
In Dep't of Transp. v. Ridley, 244 Ga. 49, 257 S.E.2d 511 (1979), the supreme court held
that section 4(d)(7) provides a method of personal service and may be used in a special
statutory proceeding which calls for "personal service" upon a party.
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dant's residence is required. It may require repeated attempts to leave
the summons and complaint with someone residing at the defendant's
home. In other instances where the plaintiff has been unable to locate and
perfect personal service upon the defendant, the courts have allowed alternate methods of service by publication and certified mail."' Furthermore, section 4(i) of the Civil Practice Act allows the court to fashion an
appropriate method of service in exigent circumstances where the method
of service is not clear or provided by law. 6 2 Though the new section
4(d)(6) still suffers from some of the problems stated in Benton and
Womble v. Commercial Credit Corp.,63 it is at least as effective as publication in most cases. Therefore, a credible argument could be made for
the constitutionality of new section 4(d)(6) by analogy to the cases approving substitute service where diligent efforts at personal service have

failed."
As a general rule where personal service upon an individual is prescribed, service upon that person's attorney will not suffice. 5 In Browning
v. Europa Hair, Inc.," the supreme court carved out an exception to the
rule holding that
where a foreign corporation files suit and obtains judgment in this state
and institutes garnishment on that judgment in this state, process in a
suit in equity to set aside that judgment under Code Ann. § 81A-160(e)
may be served upon the attorney for the foreign corporation who filed
the first suit and the garnishment. During the pendency of the garnishment such attorney is an agent of the67 foreign corporation subject to being served with the suit to set aside.
The court explained that it is reasonable to assume that the attorney

61.

See Melton v. Johnson, 242 Ga. 400, 249 S.E.2d 82 (1978); Tallant v. Tallant, 227 Ga.

26, 178 S.E.2d 887 (1970). See also GA.'CODE ANN. § 81A-104(e)(1)(i) (Supp. 1980) which
provides in part:
When the person on whom service is to be made resides out of the State, or has
departed from the State, or cannot, after due diligence, be found within the State,
or conceals himself to avoid the service of the summons . . . [the] judge or clerk
may grant an order that the service be made by the publication of summons.
62. GA. CODE ANN. § 81A-104(i) (Supp. 1980).
63. See note 58, supra, and accompanying text.
64. The analogy cannot be carried too far because, in the cases where substitute methods
of service were upheld, the plaintiff had first obtained a court order allowing the alternate
method of service. The judge could assure himself that the plaintiff had made a diligent
effort at personal service. Under section 4(d)(6), however, the plaintiff alone decides
whether he has made reasonable efforts at personal service. The decision will no doubt be
colored by the fact that the claim is relatively small in the first instance.
65. See e.g., Souter v. Carnes, 229 Ga. 220, 190 S.E.2d 69 (1972).
66. 244 Ga. 222, 259 S.E.2d 473 (1979).
67. Id. at 224-25, 259 S.E.2d at 475.
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would notify the defendant's corporate officers of any subsequent related
actions. The decision may be justifiable because, but for the peculiarities
of Georgia law, 68 an attack on a judgment would normally be in the form
of a motion in the court which rendered the judgment and could be
served upon the opposing attorney under Civil Practice Act section 5(b).1'
Browning has not been limited to attacks on judgments. In Austin v.
Austin,'70 a former husband instituted an action in the DeKalb Superior
Court against his former wife to modify the divorce decree. The wife in
turn filed a separate contempt proceeding against the husband in the
same court, but since the husband resided outside Georgia, she served the
attorney for the husband in the modification action. when the application
for contempt was called for hearing, the husband was not present and his
attorney stated that he represented the husband only for the modification
and not in the divorce or contempt. Nevertheless, the trial court cited the
husband for contempt. The husband moved to set aside the contempt for
failure of the wife to perfect service of process upon him. The supreme
court stated that Georgia's venue rules required that the modification and
contempt actions be treated differently; however, the court emphasized
that both actions related to the same subject matter, the divorce and alimony decree. "It would be unconscionable for a nonresident to be able to
seek modification of an alimony judgment in the courts of this state but
be immune at the same time to enforcement of that very same judgment." 7' The court explained that it was reasonable to expect the attorney to inform his client of the pendency of the contempt proceeding. The
court also noted that no provision clearly prescribed the method of service of a contempt on a nonresident. In this instance, service upon the
attorney was proper.
The limited exception to the rule that appears to emerge from Browning and Austin is that where an attorney represents a nonresident party
in one action, the attorney will be deemed an agent for that party to accept service of process in a subsequent action which is related to the first
action and which is served while the first action is pending and while the
attorney represents the client in that action. The essential inquiry is
whether under the circumstances it is reasonable to expect the attorney
to inform his client of the action. 72 Obviously the exception to the rule is

68.

69.

Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 81A-160(e) with GA. CODE ANN.
GA. CODE ANN. § 81A-105(b) (1977).

§ 81A-160(d).

70. 245 Ga. 487, 265 S.E.2d 788 (1980).
71. Id. at 490, 265 S.E.2d at 790.
72. The analogy of the holdings in Browning and Austin to C.P.A. section 5(b) is obvious. Section 5(b) provides for service of all papers and pleading subsequent to the complaint
upon the party's attorney. Even where amended pleadings set forth new or additional claims
related to those set out in the original complaint, it is assumed that the attorney will inform
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complicated and fragile; the safe course would be personal service upon a
party. As a last resort, however, Browning and Austin may provide an
alternative or substitute method of service in an exigent case.
B.

Filing

Section 5(e) of the Civil Practice Act states that filing of pleadings and
other papers is "made by filing them with the clerk of the court.""8 But
7 4
what if the clerk fails to file them? In Gibbs v. Spencer Industries,
the
supreme court held that delivery of the papers into the hands of the clerk
for filing within the prescribed time period is sufficient. The fact that the
clerk fails to mark them filed is immaterial.
V.

PLEADING

Two cases decided during this survey period serve to illustrate how the
Civil Practice Act has changed rules of pleading. In Bradley v. GodwinT 7
the court was faced with the question of the sufficiency of a prayer for
damages contained in a counterclaim. The trial court directed a verdict
against the defendant on the counterclaim on the general ground that she
had failed to prove her actual damages. The court of appeals agreed that
the proof of actual damages was insufficient but believed that the defendant might have been entitled to nominal damages. The court noted that
prior to the Civil Practice Act an allegation of general damages was sufficient to allow recovery of nominal damages; however, where only special
damages were alleged but not recoverable, the pleader would recover
nothing even though general or nominal damages would have been recoverable had they been alleged. The result was a confusion of the issue of
liability and of the issue of damages. A pleader might suffer a directed
verdict against him if he failed to prove damages but nevertheless made
out a jury question on the issue of liability. Although several cases decided after the Act brought forward the old rule,'7 the court viewed them
his client.
Nonetheless, the court should dispense with the presumption that service on the
attorney gives adequate notice to the litigant and should direct personal service on
the party pursuant to Rule 4(1) if service on the attorney is not likely to insure
that the party against whom the pleading is asserted will receive notice of any new
or additional claims contained in the amended pleading or (2) if the new claims
are radically different from those set out in the original pleading.

4 C.

WRIGHT

& A.

MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §

1146 (1969).

73. GA. CODE ANN. § 81A-105(e) (1977).
74. 244 Ga. 450, 260 S.E.2d 342 (1979).
75. 152 Ga. App. 782, 264 S.E.2d 262 (1979).
76. King v. Cox, 130 Ga. App. 91, 202 S.E.2d 216 (1973); Bennett v. Associated Food
Stores, 118 Ga. App. 711, 165 S.E.2d 581 (1968).

1980]

TRIAL PRACTICE

239

as suspect under the Act's relaxed rules of pleading, particularly section
54(c)(1) providing that "every final judgment shall grant the relief to
which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled even if the party
has not demanded such relief in his pleadings."7 The court concluded
"that under the Civil Practice Act it is not necessary to pray specifically
for general or nominal damages in order to present a question for the jury
as to nominal damages. 7 8 The holding also reflects an awareness of the
distinction between the elements of a claim and the question of damages
so that the fact finder may render a true verdict on the question of liability even though the damages have not been proved.
Prior to the passage of the Civil Practice Act, it was necessary for one
contesting the jurisdiction or venue of the court to allege another court
which had jurisdiction and venue of the matter;79 however, this requirement was abolished by the Act.80 In Buchan v. Duke,81 the court of appeals held that even though this pleading requirement was abolished, the
party opposing a motion to dismiss for a lack of jurisdiction or venue was
entitled to the opportunity to discover from the movant the location of
his residence before the court rules on the motion to dismiss.
VI.

PARTIES

Section 21 of the Civil Practice Act provides that "[plarties may be
dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or of its
own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just.''sa

Is a court order also required when a party merely seeks to change his
capacity rather than add a new party? The question arose in C&S Land,
Transportation& Development Corp. v. Yarbrough,13 which began as a
shareholders' derivative action against the corporation and its agents and
officers. Sometime later the plaintiffs amended their complaint to add a
personal claim against certain corporate officers and agents. The plaintiffs
did not obtain an order permitting the amendment. The trial court dismissed the amendment on the ground that it in effect added new parties
without the permission of the court as required by section 21. The court
of appeals reversed. It distinguished the case of Robinson v. Boman,"
which held that a change in status of a party from a third party defen77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

GA.
152
GA.
GA.
153
GA.
153
122

CODE ANN. § 81A-154(c) (1977).
Ga. App. at 788, 264 S.E.2d at 260.
CODE ANN. § 81-501 to 502 (1956).
CODE ANN. § 81A-201(o) (1977).
Ga. App. 310, 265 S.E.2d 308 (1980).
CODE ANN. § 81A-121 (1977).
Ga. App. 644, 266 S.E.2d 508 (1980).
Ga. App. 564, 177 S.E.2d 815 (1970).
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dant to a defendant required leave of the court. The court pointed out
that there had been no attempt to change the status of any party, only a
change in capacity. "Whether derivatively or directly involved as plaintiffs, stockholders hold beneficial interest in both the original counts and
the amended count. It follows that a 'new' party has not been added nor
has a party plaintiff changed 'status' to a party defendant.

' 85

In sum-

mary, when a party changes his position in an action, e.g., from a plaintiff
to a defendant or vice versa, there is a change of status requiring leave of
the court. Where a party merely changes from a representative capacity
to his individual capacity or vice versa, no order is required.86
Among the requirements for intervention as of right under section
24(a)(2),' 7 is that the interests of the person seeking intervention are not
adequately represented by existing parties. The case of DeKalb County v.
Post Properties, Inc.," involved an action by a landowner against the
county to have the current zoning classification declared unconstitutional
and to enjoin the defendants from preventing certain uses of the land. A
group of adjacent landowners who opposed any change in the zoning
sought to intervene as of right in the proceeding claiming an interest in
the subject matter of the litigation, potential impairment of that interest,
and inadequate representation by existing parties. The supreme court
held that even assuming that the would-be intervenors had an interest
and that there was potential impairment of that interest, they had failed
to demonstrate inadequate representation:
[W]e hold that where the interest of the intervenor is identical to that of
a governmental body or officer who is a named party, it will be assumed

that the intervenor's interests are adequately represented, absent a "concrete showing of circumstances in the particular case that make the representation inadequate.69

The would-be intervenors failed to make a showing of inadequate

85. 153 Ga. App. at 649, 266 S.E.2d at 512.
86. Where a claim is asserted against a defendant in a new capacity, it is advisable to
perfect personal service of process upon the defendant. See note 72, supra. An amended
complaint that changes the capacity of a plaintiff will relate back to the time of filing the
original complaint under C.P.A. § 15(c) (GA. CODE ANN. § 81A-115(c) (1977)) if the defendant was given notice of the claim and the claim arose out of the same conduct, transaction
or occurrence set forth in the original pleading. See Downs v. Jones, 140 Ga. App. 752, 231
S.E.2d 816 (1976); Atlanta Newspapers, Inc. v. Shaw, 123 Ga. App. 848, 182 S.E.2d 683
(1971). The same rule would apply to an amendment changing the capacity of a defendant.
See 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MIL.LE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1498 (1971).
87. GA. CODE ANN. § 81A-124(a)(2) (1977).
88. 245 Ga. 214, 263 S.E.2d 905 (1980).
89. Id. at 219, 263 S.E.2d at 909, quoting 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 1909 (1972).
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VII.
A.

DIsCOVERY

Scope Of Discovery

The discoverability of income tax returns presents a particularly thorny
problem for litigants and the courts. On the one hand they are not privileged90 and may be extremely relevant. On the other hand they are a
ready source of harassment and embarrassment which one party may
misuse to extract concessions from the other. In Borenstein v. Blumfeld,9"
the court of appeals articulated some standards for determining when discovery of federal income tax returns should be permitted:
Unless clearly required in the interest of justice, litigants ought not to be
required to submit [income tax] returns as the price for bringing or defending a lawsuit .... The interests of justice do not require production
of tax returns in the face of a motion for protective order where other
discovery methods are available to obtain the same information. 2
Under such a standard it is difficult to envision a case where the information could not be discovered through other means.
B.

Interrogatories

Following the trend of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the general
assembly amended section 33(a) of the Civil Practice Act9s to limit the
number of interrogatories that may be served without leave of the court.
The amendment provides "that no party may serve interrogatories on any
other party containing more than 50 interrogatories, including sub-parts,
upon any other party [sic] without leave of court upon a showing of complex litigation or undue hardship incurred if such additional interrogatories are not permitted.""
C.

Request to Admit

Under section 36(a)95 matters contained in a request for admission are
deemed admitted unless the opposing party serves a written denial of or
objection to the requests within thirty days of receipt. As originally en90. See Bailey v. Bruce, 132 Ga. App. 782, 209 S.E.2d 135 (1974).
91. 151 Ga. App. 420, 260 S.E.2d 377 (1979).
92. Id. at 421, 260 S.E.2d at 378, quoting Weisenberger v. W.E. Hutton & Co., 35 F.R.D.
556, 557 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
93. GA. CODE ANN. § 81A-133(a) (Supp. 1980).
94. 1980 Ga. Laws 938.
95. GA. CODE ANN. § 81A-136 (1977).
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acted, any matter admitted as a result of a failure to make a timely response was conclusive unless the party who failed to respond could
demonstrate that his failure was due to "providential cause." 6 In 1972
subsection 36(b) was amended to permit any matter admitted to be withdrawn or amended by order of the court "when the presentation of the
merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the party who obtained
the admission fails to satisfy the court that withdrawal or amendment9
will prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense on the merits.'
Notwithstanding the amendment, in 1975 the court of appeals in Osceola
Inns v. State Highway Department," held that a party could not be permitted to withdraw an admission because he had failed to show providential cause or excusable neglect. 99 In Cielock v. Munn, 0 0 the supreme court
disaproved Osceola Inns and held that whether a party should be allowed
to withdraw an admission should be determined by the two-pronged test
(1) whether the presentation of the merits would be subserved by the
withdrawal
and (2) whether the withdrawal will prejudice the opposing
10 1
party.
In another case which corrected an erroneous interpretation of section
36, the court of appeals in Hilton Hotels Corp. v. Withrow Travel Services, Inc., 0 s held that a response to a request for admission need only be
"signed by the party or by his attorney."' 0 3 Prior to 1972, responses were
required to be made under oath.'1" The 1972 amendments deleted any
requirement of an oath; 05 however, as late as 1978 the court of appeals
continued to hold that an oath was required.'" It is now settled that the
response need not be made under oath, but need only be signed by a
party or his attorney.
96. 1966 Ga. Laws 609, 649.
97. 1972 Ga. Laws 510, 530.
98. 133 Ga. App. 736, 213 S.E.2d 27 (1975).
99. See GA. CODE ANN. § 81A-106(b) (1977) which permits the trial court to relieve a
party from his failure to take some action within a prescribed time period "where the failure
to act was the result of excusable neglect."
100. 244 Ga. 810, 262 S.E.2d 114 (1979).
101. The party opposing the motion to withdraw or amend has the burden of proving
that he will be prejudiced by the withdrawal or amendment. The fact that he may be deprived of a judgment by default is not the kind of prejudice contemplated by section 36(b).
See Moore Ventures Ltd. Partnership v. Stack, 153 Ga. App. 215, 264 S.E.2d 725 (1980).
102. 150 Ga. App. 435, 258 S.E.2d 59 (1979).
103. Id.
104. See Walker Enterprises Inc. v. Mullis, 124 Ga. App. 305, 183 S.E.2d 534 (1971);
1966 Ga. Laws 609, 648-49.
105. 1972 Ga. Laws 510, 528-29.
106. Burge v. High, 147 Ga. App. 267, 248 S.E.2d 546 (1978).
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07
In Mosley v. Lankford,1
a tort action on behalf of a minor by his father as next friend, the trial court dismissed the suit for want of prosecution after no one dppeared on the minor's behalf at the call of the case.
The supreme court held that the trial court had abused its discretion in
dismissing the case. The court explained that every step of its proceedings by or against a minor occurs under the aegis of the court. Just as a
next friend or guardian ad litem has no authority to settle a claim or suit
except by leave of the court, the "next friend has no authority to forfeit
the minor's claim by lack of prosecution except by leave of court."10 8 The
court stated that the trial court should have appointed a guardian ad litern or should have taken some other action for the minor's protection
such as dismissal without prejudice rather than with prejudice.'0 9
The renewal statute" 0 permits a plaintiff to dismiss without prejudice
and to refile an action within six months even where the statute of limitations has run on the claim. Nevertheless, does the filing of an action toll
the statute of limitations so that if the plaintiff voluntarily dismisses the
action he may avail himself of the remaining time to refile even if it is
more than six months? In Rakestraw v. Berenson,"' the plaintiff made
just this argument. The claim for medical malpractice, which has a two
year statute of limitations, was first filed within eight months of accrual
of the claim. It remained pending for two years before the plaintiff dismissed. Eleven months later, the plaintiff refiled the action but the trial
court dismissed the second suit as barred by the statute of limitations.
The plaintiff argued that while the first suit was pending the statute of
limitations was suspended and that after he dismissed it he had sixteen
months (two years in which the suit was pending minus eight months
which elapsed before the first filing) remaining in which to refile the action. The court of appeals found the argument "ingenious but incorrect.""' One does not subtract the duration of the first suit from the total
elapsed time in determining whether a subsequent suit is filed within the
statute of limitations. The suit may be refiled within the original period

107. 244 Ga. 409, 260 S.E.2d 322 (1979).
108. Id. at 410, 260 S.E. 2d at 324.
109. In Matthews v. Riviera Equip. Inc., 152 Ga. App. 870, 264 S.E.2d 318 (1980), the
court of appeals held that a complaint which had been voluntarily dismissed could not sim-

ply be reinstated by order of court. The Civil Practice Act does not provide for reinstatement, only recommencement, of an action. The court reasoned that to allow a reinstatement
"would render meaningless Georgia's rule allowing only two voluntary dismissals without
prejudice." Id. at 871, 264 S.E.2d at 319.
110.
111.
112.

GA. CODE ANN. § 3-808 (1975).
153 Ga. App. 513, 266 S.E.2d 249 (1980).
Id. at 514, 266 S.E.2d at 250.
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of limitations if it has not already elapsed or it may be refiled within six
months after dismissal without prejudice if the statute of limitations expired before the dismissal.
IX.

A.

JUDGMENTS

Default Judgments

During this survey period, the general assembly amended Georgia Code
Ann. section 110-401 (1973) to delete the requirement that the question
of damages be tried before a jury in tort cases where a default judgment
has been entered.1 8 The amendment will become effective if a necessary
amendment to the constitution is ratified." 4 Section 110-401 was repealed
by the Civil Practice Act'" but continues to govern practice in courts not
covered by the Act.'" Furthermore, the legislature left untouched section
55(a) of the Act, 1 which requires a jury trial on the issues of damages in
tort cases where a default judgment has been entered. Therefore a jury
trial is still required in tort default cases in courts covered by the Civil
Practice Act.
B.

Summary Judgments

Several important cases were decided interpreting the summary judgment section of the Civil Practice Act.118 In the first case the supreme
court addressed the question of the trial court's responsibility to review
the record before ruling on a motion for summary judgment. In General
Motors Corp. v. Walker,"' the trial judge's order granting a motion for
summary judgment recited that he had reviewed the record but it was
obvioug from depositions in their original seal that he had not considered
the depositions. The court of appeals reversed the summary judgment
and remanded the matter to the trial court to consider the sealed depositions. 1 0 The court of appeals relied on language in Thompson v. Abbott"' to the effect that a trial judge should consider the entire record
before granting a motion for summary judgment. The supreme court reversed and stated that the "entire record" language from Thompson v.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

GA. CODE ANN. § 110-401 (Supp. 1980).
Id. See GA. CONST., art. VI, § 4, 1 7, GA. CODE ANN. § 2-3307 (1977).
GA. CODE ANN. § 81A-201(ee) (1977).
See Editorial Notes following GA. CODE ANN. § 110-401 (1973).
GA. CODE ANN. § 81A-155(a) (1977).
GA. CODE ANN. § 81A-156 (1977).
244 Ga. 191, 259 S.E.2d 449 (1979).
Walker v. General Motors Corp., 149 Ga. App. 524, 254 S.E.2d 871 (1979).
226 Ga. 353, 174 S.E.2d 904 (1970).
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Abbott was dicta. It then went on to establish the following rule:
If a trial court indicates in his order granting a motion for summary
judgment that the motion is being granted after a review of the record,
this court will not hold that he failed to review the relevant portions of a
deposition simply because the original of the deposition on file in the
case remained sealed and2 was not opened until after the order granting
the motion was entered.1 2

The implication of the holding is not altogether clear. Does the case simply stand for the proposition that an appellate court will not disturb an
order granting a motion for summary judgment which is otherwise proper
merely because it is obvious that the trial court did not personally read
every paper on file? Or does it mean that there is no obligation upon the
trial judge to consider the entire record but only those portions of the
record brought to his attention by counsel? The court's disavowal of the
"entire record" language from Thompson v. Abbott, and its seemingly approving reference to a concurring opinion by Judge Banke of the court of
appeals, would seem to point to the latter interpretation. In his concurring opinion in Realty Contractors,Inc. v.Citizens & Southern National
Bank,12 3 Judge Banke expressed the opinion that a busy trial judge

should not be put to the task of reviewing the entire record. Rather the
responsibility to bring forward pertinent portions of the record should be
placed upon counsel. Given this interpretation of section 56, it is not sufficient for a party simply to put his evidence on file. In order to obtain or
defeat a motion for summary judgment the parties must digest the record
and "tender into evidence those documents they are relying on to support
their positions, pointing out specifically the portion of the documents believed to be relevant." ' It should be emphasized that Walker did not
specifically state that this practice is part of the parties' burden under
section 56(e) of showing the absence or existence of genuine questions of
fact, but it is one possible interpretation of the decision."
122. 244 Ga. at 193, 259 S.E.2d at 451.
123. 146 Ga. App. 69, 245 S.E.2d 342 (1978).
124. Id. at 71, 245 S.E.2d at 344 (Banke, J., concurring specially).
Such a reading of section 56 is inconsistent with the interpretation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
Under the federal rule, "the court is obliged to take account of the entire setting of the case
on a Rule 56 motion. In addition to the pleadings, it will consider all papers of record, as
well as any other material prepared for the motion that meets the standard prescribed in
Rule 56(e)." 10 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 272 (1973)
(footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
125. The decision in Walker leaves many questions unanswered. For example, what happens in a case where the trial court grants a summary judgment but it appears that there is
evidence in the record which raises questions of fact but which the party opposing the motion failed to bring to the trial court's attention? What is the scope of appellate review?
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In Cruce v. Randall,36 the supreme court addressed the issue "whether
it was proper to enter summary judgment in favor of the nonmoving
party plaintiff as well as for the movant party plaintiff, absent written
notice or waiver thereof. 11 2 7 The court noted that under Fed. R. Civ. P.

56 a summary judgment could be granted to a nonmoving party provided
1 28
that the opposing party had notice and an opportunity to respond.
Cruce v. Randall was unlike the federal cases because the party against
whom summary judgment was rendered did not receive notice of the
court's intention to render summary judgment for the nonmovant. Nevertheless, the court held it was not error to render the summary judgment.
Since both the moving and nonmoving plaintiffs were joint obligees on a
note, the issues were the same as to both of them. Therefore, the defendant had received notice from the moving party and had responded to the
merits. Finally the nonmovant consented to entry of judgment.
Over the years many rules of thumb for deciding motions for summary
judgment have been formulated. One of those rules, first enunciated in
Rubel Baking Co. v. Levitt, 2 9 states that where the defendant asserts a
legally sufficient counterclaim for damages in excess of the amount demanded in the complaint, it is ordinarily not error to deny the plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment on his claim. The reason for the rule was
that where there was a chance that the plaintiff's recovery might be reduced or offset by the counterclaims, the interest of judicial economy may
be served by denying the motion for summary judgment. Through the
years the rule evolved into virtually a per se rule that it was error to
grant a motion for summary judgment in the face of a legally sufficient
counterclaim in excess of the complaint.130 In Mock v. CanterburyRealty
13 1
Co.,

the court of appeals reviewed the decisions since Rubel Baking and

rejected any hard and fast rules for dealing with cases with counterclaims.
There seems to be no sound reason to conclude that where there is a
pending valid counterclaim, the trial court must deny a persuasive and
valid motion for summary judgment, or alternative, that it is error per se
to grant a motion for summary judgment where there is a pending, valid

126. 245 Ga. 669, 266 S.E.2d 486 (1980).
127. Id. at 669, 266 S.E.2d at 487.
128. See 6 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE $ 56.12. See also 10 C. WRIGHT & A.
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

§

MILLER,

2720 (1973). In Golston v. Garigan, 245 Ga. 450, 451,
265 S.E.2d 590, 591 (1980), the court held that "summary judgment can be granted to a
non-moving party provided that the grant is proper in all other respects."
129. 118 Ga. App. 306, 163 S.E.2d 437 (1968).
130. See Match Point, Ltd. v. Adams, 148 Ga. App. 673, 252 S.E.2d 90 (1979); McDonald
v. Parker, 134 Ga. App. 577, 215 S.E.2d 334 (1975).
131. 152 Ga. App. 872, 264 S.E.2d 489 (1980).
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8

The majority, however, did not overrule Rubel Baking, but reiterated its
holding that ordinarily it was not error to deny a motion for summary
judgment in the face of a counterclaim that might reduce or offset the
plaintiff's recovery. It is not error, however, to grant the motion in such a
case if it is otherwise proper to do so.""
Finally, it is well-settled that a summary judgment is an improper vehicle to dispose of a dilatory plea or plea in abatement.8 4 But what happens in the frequent case where a matter in abatement is disposed of by
summary judgment? Must a plaintiff appeal such a ruling in order that it
not become res judicata? The supreme court addressed this question in
National Heritage Corp. v. Mount Olive Memorial Gardens, Inc.,1 s5
where the trial court granted a summary judgment against the plaintiff
on the ground that the plaintiff, a foreign corporation, had not obtained a
certificate of authority prior to filing suit as required by law.15s The plaintiff did not appeal. In a second suit involving the same subject matter, the
defendant raised the defense of res judicata based on the summary judgment in the first suit and the trial court dismissed the second suit on that
ground. The supreme court noted that the failure to obtain a certificate of
authority was a matter in abatement or dilatory plea and that summary
judgment was inapposite. The court held that the plaintiff did not need
to appeal that order to preserve its rights. Rather the court formulated a
test for determining whether the disposition was an adjudication on the
merits and was therefore res judicata.
We hold that where an order granting summary judgment in a prior suit
is relied upon in final support of a plea of res judicata in a subsequent
suit, the court considering the plea of res judicata should examine the
underlying basis of the summary judgment. If that summary judgment
132. Id. at 878, 264 S.E.2d at 494.
133. In Howard v. Walker, 242 Ga. 406, 249 S.E.2d 45 (1978), the supreme court enunciated the rule that where a plaintiff must produce expert testimony to prevail at trial and the
defendant moves for summary judgment supported by expert opinion, the plaintiff must
adduce expert opinion in opposition to the defendant's evidence or suffer a summary judgment against him. In a medical malpractice case, Parker v. Knight, 245 Ga. 782, 267 S.E.2d
222 (1980), the court held that the rule in Howard v. Walker applied even though the sole
expert opinion offered by the defendant was his own. The court of appeals had held that the
opinion of a party alone was insufficient to pierce the pleadings. Knight v. Parker, 152 Ga.
App. 467, 263 S.E.2d 248 (1979). The supreme court, however, explained that a party to an
action is as competent to testify as any other witness and that no rule of law states that
defendants in medical malpractice cases are incompetent to testify unless their testimony is
corroborated.
134. See Ogden Equip. Co. v. Talmadge Farms, 232 Ga. 614, 208 S.E.2d 459 (1974).
135. 244 Ga. 240, 260 S.E.2d 1 (1979).
136. See GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1421(c) (1977).
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actually was an adjudication of the merits (a plea in bar, or otherwise on
the merits), the plea of res judicata should be sustained. However, if examination shows that the summary judgment actually was not an adjudi-

cation of the merits (a dilatory plea, etc.), the res judicata plea should be
denied. Code Ann. § 110-503. (If it is unclear why summary judgment
was granted, the order itself should be appealed.) 1 7
C.

Merger of Judgments

In Jacoby v. Jacoby,' " the plaintiff sought to domesticate and enforce
an unsatisfied 1976 California judgment for alimony. The defendant
maintained that the California judgment had been merged into a later
Florida judgment which was based upon the California judgment. The
court of appeals determined that the question of merger in this context
was one of first impression in Georgia. It, therefore, adopted the majority
rule that "a judgment recovered in one state is not merged in a judgment
recovered in another state where the judgments are based on the same
claim and are of equal dignity."139 The court reasoned that the rule would
permit successive suits in different states until the original judgment was
satisfied.

137.
138.
139.

244 Ga. at 243, 260 S.E.2d at 3 (citation omitted).
150 Ga. App. 725, 258 S.E.2d 534 (1979).
Id. at 727, 258 S.E.2d at 536.

